Audit quality: Attributes, private safeguards and the role of regulation by Benito Arruñada
Audit Quality: Attributes, Private




Trias Fargas, 25; 08005-Barcelona, E-Spain
Email: benito.arrunada@econ.upf.es
Barcelona, January 7, 2000
Abstract
This article examines the private mechanisms used to safeguard quality in auditing, with a view
to defining rules capable of facilitating the performance of market forces.  An outline is given
of a general theory of private quality assurance in auditing, based on the use of quasi-rents to
self-enforce quality dimensions. Particular attention is paid to the role of fee income
diversification as the key ingredient of private incentives for audit quality.  The role of public
regulation is then situated in the context defined by the presence of these safeguard
mechanisms.  This helps in defining the content of rules and the function of regulatory bodies in
facilitating and strengthening the protective operation of the market.  By making sense of the
interaction between regulation, quality attributes and private safeguards, the analysis helps to
evaluate the relative merits of different regulatory options.
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1 Attributes of auditing quality which are crucial for regulation
The demand for auditing services arises from a need to facilitate dealings between the parties
involved in business relationships—shareholders, creditors, public authorities, employees and
customers, etc.  Exchanges between such parties are usually costly since informational
asymmetries give rise to uncertainty concerning the performance of the contractual obligations.
In this context of contractual opportunism and, along with other instruments and safeguards,
accounts are used to enhance the likelihood of performance and demonstrate a willingness to
perform to potential contracting parties.
1  The preparation of accounts is controlled by one of
the parties only (either the executives of a large company or an individual businessman in
smaller undertakings).  In this way, figures can be produced at lower cost but they are also
used—perhaps principally—for internal management and control purposes.  This dual capacity
of executives and businessmen as agents to be monitored and as those responsible for actually
preparing the accounts reduces the value of the latter to third parties.  A review of accounts by
an independent expert, the external auditor, is useful to enhance their reliability in the eyes of
other contracting parties who are not involved in their preparation.  There is thus a demand
amongst companies for independent auditing to reduce their contractual or transaction costs.
This has been verified empirically by observing that the increased contractual conflict resulting
from a greater separation between ownership and control or a higher level of indebtedness
leads to greater demand for auditing services.  It has also been observed that contractual costs
fall largely as auditing quality is increased.
2
                                                
1 This view of auditing is derived from Jensen and Meckling (1976: 338-9).
2 A large number of empirical works have in fact verified the existence of a positive
relationship between different variables which are connected to the intensity of agency costs
and the choice of higher quality auditors.  In a retrospective analysis, Chow (1982) showed
that in 1926, prior to legislation in the United States making auditing obligatory, voluntary
demand for auditing amongst American companies depended on different indicators which it
seems reasonable to believe were directly related to the degree of conflict between
management, shareholders and creditors.  Such indicators included the proportion of shares not
owned by management, levels of indebtedness, the size of the business and the number of
clauses linked to accounting information in loan agreements.  Other empirical studies have
demonstrated the significance of agency cost variables on change of auditor, revealing the
expected effect even after taking account of varying client size and growth, the variables
considered to have the greatest influence on change of auditor decisions. (See, in particular,
Francis and Wilson [1988], as well as Defond [1992]).  This is also shown by the fact that
most companies which go public on the Stock Exchange (and therefore increase potential2
Auditing quality depends on the ability of the auditor to carry out a thorough examination of
the accounts and detect possible errors or anomalies ( technical competence) and his
willingness to provide an objective opinion on them (his  independence).
3  Careful
consideration of these two dimensions and the quality safeguards that are provided by the
market is crucial for regulation to be efficient.  In particular, technical competence can be
hindered and independence trivialized if auditors are not allowed to exercise their professional
judgement (Section 1.1).  In addition, independence is not only a matter for the parties that are
directly involved but also concerns third parties, mainly other clients (Section 1.2).
1.1 Professional judgement
Auditing increases the informational value of the accounts and it is therefore desirable that the
auditor’s opinion should reflect as much information as possible.  For this reason, it is very
important for the auditor to incorporate into his report a picture of the audited business based
on facts known to him, even if these facts are difficult for third parties to verify.  This
possibility will be referred to as the exercise of professional judgement by the auditor and it
is a crucial attribute of auditing quality because it substantially enhances the informational
value of auditing for third parties. Since they have to convey unverifiable information, it is not
sufficient for auditors merely to be independent.  What is required of them is that they exercise
their professional judgement independently. It would be prejudicial if, in order to preserve
their independence, auditors were obliged to refrain from making a professional judgement
since the latter provides valuable information to those using the company’s accounts.
This, in broad terms, is the argument as to the relative nature of auditor independence in
terms of information economics propounded by Grout,  Jewitt and  Whittington (1994).  In
                                                                                                                                                       
contractual conflict) switch auditor to one of the large firms. Carpenter and Strawser (1971)
documented this in the United States in a classic study.  It has furthermore been shown, with
companies going public, that the greater their agency costs the more likely they are to obtain
audit services from larger firms (Firth and Smith, 1992).
3 This definition of quality comes from the so-called Positive Accounting Theory.  See, in
particular, Watts and Zimmerman (1986: 314-5; 1980: 8) and DeAngelo (1981b: 186). In terms
of technical competence and independence, it provides a useful breakdown for analysis since it
defines two relatively distinct problems and therefore enables specialized rules and practices
to be devised to support each of them.  The two dimensions are not totally separate, however,
in that a lack of independence may come to light in decisions which reduce effective technical
competence as when the auditor decides not to make an effort to discover problems which he
does not wish to report on.3
developing their argument, they use a fundamental distinction made in modern information
economics—in particular, in the theory of incomplete contracts—between information which is
merely observable by the parties (in this case, the auditor) and that which is also verifiable by
third parties (here, the legal system).
4  The auditor can use two types of information in his
professional judgement: what they call “hard” information, which is observable and verifiable,
and “soft” information which is observable but not verifiable. Specifically, they assume
(although similar conclusions can be reached on more restrictive assumptions) that, in the case
of auditing, hard information can be suppressed from the accounts but not equivocally
transmitted.  Soft information, on the contrary, can be transmitted only in an equivocal and
subjective manner.
In order to maximize the value of auditing, the regulatory framework must make it possible
for auditors to use this soft information regarding the client and transmit it to the market and
third parties.  To this end, they must exercise their professional judgement on both categories of
information.  In fact, if the regulatory framework penalizes them excessively, they will only
make use of the hard information so the audit will contribute less information and may
sometimes even be misleading. An auditor might, for instance, play safe and disclose his
reservations even when he considers that the client’s situation would not warrant such
reservations after taking into account the soft information available to him, which he is not, in
fact, allowed to transmit.
5
Using this type of distinction, negotiation between auditor and client as to the content of
accounts should be positively reconsidered.  This gives accounts a more subtle and contextual
                                                
4 Grossman and Hart were pioneers in differentiating between observable and verifiable
information in their article on vertical integration (1986).
5 Evidence regarding auditor switching provides indirect indications that different economic
agents have access to, and can verify, varying types of information.  Krishnan (1994) found that
a change of auditor is more likely when the auditor gives a qualified opinion applying
apparently conservative criteria in relation to the observable financial position of the business.
The results of another study (Krishnan and Stephens, 1995) are consistent with the following
explanation: the first auditor has private information which leads him to be conservative, and
the second also has access to this information and therefore does not modify his opinion
compared with that of the former auditor.  Obviously, he too cannot previously commit himself
to issuing an unqualified opinion given his lack of knowledge of the client. Although the set of
information which is verifiable by a judge probably includes all the information observable by
researchers carrying out this type of empirical study, a comparison of the two situations has at
least an indicative value to the effect that those participating in economic activities use sets of
information with different properties in terms of observability.4
informative function: “the most informative thing about accounts as currently prepared might
not be the literal interpretation of the information they contain (claimed debt-equity ratios,
profits, etc.), but the fact that an apparently competent group of professional auditors, after
exercising their professional judgement, is prepared to let the company make the claims that it
does, even though the auditors thereby leave themselves open to the possibility of large law
suits” (Grout et al., 1994: 332).  The role of auditor decisions is thus understood in the context
of how recipients of accounts process the information.  Assume, for example, that an auditor
agrees to suppress detailed hard information in such a way that the accounts only include a
generic and ambiguous statement of the “including adjustment of taxation reserves” type.  It
could be argued that this phrase is sufficient for readers to assume the worst in relation to the
amount affected, which is not divulged.
6  However, the recipient of the information will assess
positively the fact that the auditor has agreed not to detail the information, taking it as a signal
of confidence.  The reader knows that the auditor is taking a risk  and assumes that he would
only do this if he considered that the matter would be unlikely to give rise to future litigation or
loss of reputation.  In other words, the suppression of negative hard information from some
audited accounts in itself implies the dissemination of positive soft information. “ In the
signalling equilibrium, a statement like ‘including a transfer from taxation reserves’ has a
conventional meaning: the client firm has soft and hard information that together exclude the
worst possible cases. Firms who are regarded by creditors to have sufficiently high expected
collateral value (conditional on the accounts) receive continuing financing and, for the time
being, are allowed to proceed with their business plans” (Grout et al., 1994: 335).
This analysis has far-reaching consequences for both the ends and the means of legislative
and regulatory policies in the auditing field.  In the first case, it justifies legislators and
regulators adopting the objective of optimizing the value of the information which the audit
provides to users.  They should therefore consider that the rules define the type of audit which
it is possible to carry out.  Secondly, with respect to the means for bringing about this
objective, regulations which purport to achieve maximum independence can prevent auditors
                                                
6 This was the situation in the Royal Mail case, dealt with by Grout et al. (1994: 333-4).5
from transmitting the soft information available to them.  If they have to base their opinion on
hard information only, the audit will be likely to have less informative content, however.
7
From this point of view, when defining the context in which auditors work, legislators can
make as many mistakes in one direction as in the other, laying down the rules in either too lax
or too stringent a manner.  If the rules are too stringent, auditors will tend to carry out
“defensive audits” and only use hard information since this can be used as a defense in
litigation.  Moreover, they will refuse to base their decisions on soft information which will
not assist in their defense if the client ends up with problems in the future. If the rules are too
lax, auditors might bow to the demands of their clients and be very lenient, giving their
approval to companies which do not warrant it in view of their high degree of vulnerability.
8
However, this consequence cannot be generalized.  This may be the conduct of some
auditors but the market provides incentives for at least some of them to develop a reputation for
exercising balanced professional judgements.  Let us consider an extreme case in which the
law does not provide any system of sanctions against auditors and it is also impracticable to
sue them.  It is foreseeable that in such a situation there would be greater development of
private enforcement and sanctioning instruments.  These would be based on the auditor’s
reputation and the castigation of underperformance through switching decisions.
9  Firstly, there
is no doubt that in this situation auditing firms have incentives to develop a good professional
reputation since there will be clients who demand auditing with an optimum degree of
independence and this would not be the outcome of a very lax legal system. On the other hand,
there is no risk that the market will itself generate an excessive level of sanctions, which would
be equivalent to a situation of excessively stringent rules, because the market is probably more
competent than the legal system when it comes to verifying qualitative information for several
reasons: (a) the market is not restricted to the use of specific types of evidence; (b) it acts by
accumulating an almost infinite number of individual decisions and therefore individual
variables are of little importance; (c) such decisions are taken largely by professionals who
can be assumed to be well-informed because they have incentives to be informed; and (d)
negotiating costs in this case are nil (as compared with their equivalent in a legal process or
                                                
7 The report from the  Centre for European Policy Studies on the proper government of
companies shared this view in relation to the regulation of accounting information by statutory
rules in continental Western Europe (CEPS, 1995, p. 18).
8 As do Grout et al. for example (1994, p. 336).6
out-of-court agreement).  As a result, much of the information which is observable by auditors
but not verifiable by the legal system is verifiable by the market, and auditors will have no
hesitation in using it if the potential sanction comes from the market rather than the legal
system.
There is thus substantial asymmetry between the consequences of the two types of regulatory
error.  The risk with laxity can at least in part be corrected by the market and, moreover, does
not pose obstacles to using all types of information. The risk with excessive strictness, on the
other hand, cannot be corrected: all auditors, whatever their reputation, are forced to dispense
with soft information when preparing their professional judgements.  Moreover, if there is
greater variability in the sanctions of a legal type, this adds force to the argument that
increasing them tends to bias the content of the audit, making it less informative.
1.2 The impact of independence on third parties and other clients
Regulation should also take into account that the asymmetry and conflicts arising in relation to
auditing quality are more complex than in most markets since it is dealing with contractual
facilitation with at least three interested parties  (clients, auditors and users).  In this respect,
auditor independence is the most conflictive attribute.  Firstly, the role played by auditing in
third-party contracting means that the client will require independence or otherwise depending
on his situation.  In problematical cases, although the client in principle usually wants high-
quality auditing, after his financial situation changes he may prefer a low-quality audit in terms
of independence.  More precisely, he would prefer a dependent auditor who is perceived by
third parties as being independent.  This is because a deceptive audit will enable him either to
contract with third parties on better terms than those otherwise available in his situation if
known to such third parties, or to postpone the review of those contracts which involve
corrective action based on financial situation (as normally occurs, for example, in the case of
loan agreements).
10  In order for this deception to have the desired effect on third parties, these
third parties must obviously attribute the auditor with superior quality to that which he is
actually providing since, otherwise, they would discount a favorable report and the report
would lose its value in terms of evidencing the client’s situation.
                                                                                                                                                       
9 There would also be a wider role for competition amongst certifying bodies.
10 See, for example, Smith and Warner (1979).7
Third parties who enter a contract trusting in an audit which they believe is independent are
not the only economic parties damaged by a deceptive audit.  They are perhaps not even the
most damaged parties when the legal system imposes strict professional liability on the auditor
because other clients of the auditing firm will also be harmed.  If it is assumed, specially by
third parties, that auditors generally provide a uniform level of quality in their audits
(particularly in terms of independence), clients who continue wanting an independent auditor to
demonstrate their financial good health will see their names associated with that of an auditor
tainted by lack of independence.  Moreover, unlike these clients of the auditor, affected third
parties can have recourse to the legal system to obtain compensation for any loss caused to
them by the lack of independence.
11  They also have the active presence of professional bodies
to support them along with regulators of the auditing profession and the securities market
supervisory bodies.
As a result, to a large extent the conflict regarding independence does not manifest itself so
much between auditors and those using the accounts of a client in a difficult situation as
between auditors and their other clients who do not wish the independence of their auditor to
be diminished.
12  The cost to one of these clients of his auditor reducing quality and this being
visible (through a scandal, for example) arises not only in respect of the direct loss to him from
the fact that those using his accounts have less confidence in them, but also because of the
deterioration in “specific” assets, those whose value is associated with continuity in his
                                                
11 This compensation may also be excessive in those countries in which the auditor is subject to
a system of joint and several liability, including several continental countries (Buijink et al.,
1996: 96).
12 Readers familiar with management practices and the economic literature of franchises will
recognize in this conflict a structure that is very similar to that often arising between
franchisees of the same franchisor.  Franchisee establishments tend to reduce the quality of
their services to the prejudice of the reputation of the brand name and its network of
establishments.  For this reason, an essential function of the franchisor is to safeguard quality
and take disciplinary measures against those who do not fulfil minimum standards.  When
taking disciplinary measures such as expulsion, the franchisor does so to the benefit not only of
himself but, and perhaps principally, to the benefit of the other franchisees.  It is believed that
the periodic collection of commissions of a variable nature (which incurs a cost in lessening
the incentives of franchisees) is precisely aimed at giving the franchisor an incentive to carry
out this disciplinary function effectively.  See the works of Rubin (1978: 227), Brickley and
Dark (1987: 410) and Lafontaine (1992: 279). Moreover, litigation brought by franchisees
against their franchisors as a result of inadequate control of members of the network is
commonplace.  A famous case in the United States was Creel Enterprises vs. Mr. Gatti’s. The
former sued the franchisor as it was harmed by the repeated breach by another member of the
chain of obligations imposed on all the franchisees (Johnson, 1992: 18).8
relationship with the auditor.
13  If, by way of reaction, he decides to change auditor, he will
lose all these assets.  Alternatively, if the client decides to continue with his original auditor,
he will suffer a loss in terms of the diminished value of the audit to recipients and, therefore, in
terms of the increased agency costs he will incur in his relationships with them. Since the
scandal affects his negotiating power with the auditor,  if he decides to continue the
relationship, he can be expected to transfer part of this loss to the auditor by means of a price
reduction.  (From this point of view, the need to discipline the auditor who compromises his
reputation for independence helps explain why, under a system of freedom of contract, auditing
contracts are entered into on an annual basis, despite the fact that the relationship usually lasts
for a much longer period of between 30 and 40 years).
14  From this perspective, it can therefore
be argued that regulation should modify its current emphasis on the effect that auditing failure
has on third parties because, in so doing, it would strengthen market incentives
2 Private quality safeguards and the role of regulation
Quality can be ensured by both explicit and implicit contracting.  With the former, breach by
the supplier can result in litigation and a consequent legal sanction.  This method is in general
only used for certain types of breach, without doubt due to its high cost and rigidity and, in
particular, the fact that in order to be effective the breach must be verifiable by third parties.  In
the case of auditing, for example, an auditor may be obliged to compensate those affected by
the insolvency of a company whose accounts have been defectively audited.  With implicit
contracting, on the other hand, the penalty for breach is imposed by potential contracting parties
withdrawing their confidence from the person in breach and, as a result, not contracting with
                                                
13 Specific assets are resources that are more valuable in their current use than in their best
alternative use. Seminal works in this area were Klein et al. (1978) and Williamson (1975 and
1979). The idea that asset specificity economizes in safeguards was suggested generally by
Klein and Leffler (1981: 627-9) and applied to auditing by DeAngelo (1981b: 193-4).
14 For European companies, data from Ridyard and De Bolle (1992: 89-91) enable the average
rotation period to be estimated at between 30 and 40 years.  Large companies seem to have a
lower rotation rate.  Thus, in a study of 3,500 audits carried out between 1980 and 1988 in
England it was estimated that the average length of each relationship was 40 years (“Auditors
Too Cosy with Clients?” [Accountancy, January 1995: 11]).  Ridyard and De Bolle provide
similar data for Great Britain: in a sample of 137 large companies, the rotation rate was lower
than 1% between 1987 and 1990 (1992: 89).  The figures are similar in the United States
where rotation affects a percentage of between 1% of large companies and 6% of small9
him or demanding more onerous terms from him. The clearest example is the loss of reputation
which is usually associated with the disclosure of any type of breach.  It will be shown that
with auditing the loss of clientele which accompanies public awareness of deficient audits is
very high.  The advantages of implicit over explicit contracting lie in its automatic nature and
its scope: more information is processed at a lower or nil cost since, as this information is a
by-product, no administration cost is required.  Moreover, decisions to sanction are
decentralized.  At root it is each individual potential contracting party who in part acts as a
judge of the auditor’s conduct.  This makes it possible to process a greater quantity and variety
of information in such a way that non-compliance can be penalized in a more appropriate
manner.  Unlike the legal system which must often deal with discrete criteria of the “all or
nothing” type, the quasi-judicial operation of the market thus provides for a whole range of
sanctions.
For these reasons, a large proportion of quality safeguards in both auditing and other
economic activities basically arise in the form of “implicit contracts”.  In these, compliance
with obligations cannot be judicially enforced, but depends on the internal incentives of the
parties, especially those which generate reputation.  The mechanism on which such implicit
contracts are based is thus the benefit to the party who is obliged to perform them.  This type of
benefit is a “quasi-rent”, meaning the difference between the remuneration for any productive
resource in its current use and the maximum remuneration which would be received for its best
alternative use.
15  In order for implicit contracting to be effective, there must be a credible
commitment that the agent—in this case the auditor—will receive a stream of quasi-rents
giving him the incentive to perform properly.
There are various more or less costly ways in which an economic agent can be placed in a
position where he has an incentive to perform his obligations rather than be penalized by the
market—i.e., by his potential contracting parties.
16
                                                                                                                                                       
companies each year (see the studies cited by DeAngelo (1981b: 188-9) and Beck, Frecka and
Salomon (1988b: 68-9).
15 Studies into how the expectation of obtaining a stream of quasi-rents in the future provides an
automatic incentive for producers to preserve the quality of their products or services were
begun by Becker and Stigler (1974) and developed by Klein and Leffler (1981), Williamson
(1983) and Shapiro (1983).
16 The following has been developed more fully in Arruñada (1999: 24-34).10
2.1 High-cost safeguards
There are two main types of high-cost strategies for assuring performance.  First, advertising
and other types of marketing generate a “brand-name capital” In particular, advertising,
perhaps the most conspicuous of such outlays, generates an “advertising capital” which serves
as a guarantee, even when it is not directly informative: simply having advertised provides an
incentive to sell a good product of uniform quality which does not let down expectations.  For
this reason, advertising impacts, once achieved, constitute an intangible asset whose rapid
volatility as a consequence of  defective performance amounts to a substantial advantage in
effectively acting as a quality safeguard.
Second, regulatory authorities can also replicate reputational incentives by establishing or
allowing the establishment of barriers to engaging in the activity.  Such restrictions,
accompanied by selection of entrants based on potential technical competence, have in fact
been the formula traditionally used to guarantee a minimum level of quality in all types of
professional services, often under a system of self-regulation by the profession itself, both
explicit and implicit.  These barriers to entry generate quasi-rents.  Consequently, they may
ensure a minimum level of quality if producers confront expulsion—and loss of quasi-rents—
as a result of malpractice.
However, both possibilities are costly from the social point of view and some are
inapplicable to auditing.  Advertising consumes actual resources and is also prohibited under
the regulations of many European countries,
17 even though there may be no reason to justify this
prohibition which, based on available empirical evidence, is prejudicial to both competition
and quality.
18  Generating incentives by entry barriers, on the other hand, poses all the
problems inherent in the restrictive regulation of professional services.  Essentially it is of
doubtful effectiveness and involves a serious risk of monopoly and regulatory capture.  It thus
generates direct inefficiencies by raising prices and consequently restricting supply, as well as
                                                
17 Within the EU, advertising is allowed in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Buijink et al., 1996: 53). Moreover,
even in some of these countries the unsolicited offering of audit services is prohibited,
specifically in Austria, the Netherlands and UK.  Outside the EU, advertising is permitted, with
different qualifications, in Australia, Canada and the United States.  Unsolicited offering of
audit services is forbidden in Australia and Canada. Both practices are forbidden in Japan.
18 For instance, Jeter and Erickson (1995) have observed that defective audits are less frequent
in those American states that allow unsolicited offering of services.11
indirect inefficiencies by unleashing competition or “rent-seeking” processes when potential
entrants compete to secure monopoly rents.
2.2 Low-cost safeguards
There are also low-cost strategies for generating performance incentives.  They are based on
prior performance of obligations, a cross-market reputation spread and the use of real assets
with a value linked to a continued presence in an activity or market.  These are all applicable
to the auditing field and because of their low cost are preferable from the social point of view.
Regulation would thus do well to facilitate them and enhance their effectiveness.
a) The most elementary strategy of this type is to build a reputation by providing higher
than expected quality and refraining from opportunistic behavior.
19  This is of fundamental
importance and forms the cornerstone of the system of safeguards.  It operates slowly,
however, and can also result in allocative inefficiencies when introductory pricing is used,
20
although these inefficiencies are probably of a secondary nature.  Moreover, the value of a
reputational guarantee is highly sensitive, this being precisely the result of its high degree of
effectiveness.  This sensitivity, however, becomes a disadvantage when subjected to
opportunistic or arbitrary action.  For this reason, regulation must ensure that reputational
penalties are in line with the breach of professional duties.   In particular, it must prevent those
not in breach from being penalized.  In this respect, the legal system must prevent undue loss of
reputation from being caused by competitors and, in particular, by supposedly independent
third parties.
b) The strategy based on stretching reputation or other safeguards used in one market to
facilitate contracting in other markets is also low-cost.
21  Audit firms have used this strategy to
sell non-audit services, which tend to be problematical to contract as a result of informational
asymmetry in relation to their quality.  For this reason, auditors are natural providers of such
services since they can ensure their quality by means of the reputational assets they have built
up in supplying reliable auditing services.  The fact that such contractual resources can be used
                                                
19 The costs of developing a reputation to safeguard auditing quality are shown in several
empirical studies, mainly Craswell, Francis and Taylor (1995).
20 For an introduction on the multiple possibilities of signaling quality through pricing, see
Carlton and Perloff (1994: 562, n. 4).12
in a more intensive and efficient manner means that it is inadvisable to adopt rules making it
more difficult to provide services.  These contractual economies of scope flow both ways.
Thus, not only do new non-audit services benefit from the reputation acquired in providing
audit services, but the effect is mutual: reputation and other safeguards are utilized more
intensively by broadening the set of activities carried out by the firm. As a consequence, the
quality of audit services is also being ensured at a lower cost, or better quality is provided at
the same level of safeguarding costs.
c) The third low-cost strategy is the  use of specific assets with a value that would
deteriorate when clients are lost or when the provider eventually has to abandon the activity
completely.
22 In auditing, the main such asset is the information accumulated on clients, their
activities and the markets in which they operate.  These specific assets can act as safeguards or
hamper quality.  The role they play will depend on audit firm size,
23 and the degree of client
diversification.  In a firm with a single client the threat of losing such assets, which are to a
large extent “client specific”, may make the auditor more disposed to compromise his
independence.
24  In a firm with a diverse client base, on the other hand, specific assets act as a
safeguard.  The reason is that, if its independence vis-à-vis one client is compromised, the
auditor retains the assets specific to the particular client but endangers the assets specific to
other clients. If a lack of independence is discovered, other clients would tend to change
auditor or penalize him in some other way. This analysis of specific assets is of considerable
                                                                                                                                                       
21 For a classical analysis on how these issues are seen by marketing experts, see Aaker
(1991).
22 See footnote 13 for a definition and references.
23 As pointed out in the pioneering work of DeAngelo (1981b), the connection between the size
of the audit firm and, consequently, the volume of its specific assets and audit quality is
unquestionable in relation to technical competence.  It must be qualified in relation to
independence, however, since, as there is a positive correlation between the size of firms and
the size of their clients, client diversification may determine independence more than the mere
size of the firm.
24 Many models of auditor behavior consider only one audit relationship. One such is that by
Dye (1991), who analyzes the effect of auditor quasi-rents on the perception of auditor
independence by external observers.  As a consequence of considering only one client,
observable auditor quasi-rents exert an unambiguously negative effect on the perception of
independence.  The effects that quasi-rent appropriation by the auditor exert on the value of the
clientele of the firm as a whole are also important.  These suggest that auditor quasi-rents might
favor independence.  Applying Dye’s reasoning, discounting the price of the initial audit
(“lowballing”) could even serve just the opposite purpose: to raise real auditor independence
to the level expected by outsiders.13
importance to regulation since the latter can promote diversification or even make it
mandatory, although the latter option is less advisable.
25
d) Self-regulation and organizational safeguards.  Independent auditing mainly serves to
reduce any conflicts which may arise in contracting with those providing financial resources,
whether shareholders or creditors. Clients are therefore interested in users of the audited
accounting information perceiving the auditor as independent of the client.  Such client concern
leads to a concern amongst auditors themselves and it is understandable that they should
implement policies of all types aimed at reinforcing their independence. For this purpose,
codes of good practice have been adopted by professional self-regulatory bodies and firms
themselves.  Firstly, professional organizations must maintain a good reputation if they are to
survive. Over the years, they have taken care to adopt various standards and organizational
patterns with a view to reducing risks which could harm auditor independence and, in
particular, the appearance of independence.
26  Secondly, many incentive and control devices of
an individual, hierarchical and mutual nature ensure that both individual auditors working for
audit firms as well as divisions within a firm and affiliated firms within a network have strong
incentives to maintain the required attributes of service quality, including independence.  The
following are a few of these devices: partners’ remuneration is not based primarily on revenue
generation or short-term local profits, but on performance variables which encourage them to
take a broad perspective, including the global results of the firm and measures of service
quality; internal procedures to avoid individual biases and overconfidence are common, such
as having audit engagement partners serve public companies for no longer than a certain
number of years; finally, control is also exercised among offices and countries, by having
personnel from one area inspect the work of another geographic area.
                                                
25 This argument has been further developed in Arruñada (1999: 143-55; 1997: 63-87).  An
application was also adapted to analyze mandatory auditor rotation in Arruñada and Paz-Ares
(1997: 48-56).
26 The general guidelines of the Federation of European Accounting Experts (FEE) are
representative of the spirit of these standards in that they state the following.  “In considering
whether to undertake other assignments for an entity of which he is auditor, the auditor’s duty is
to satisfy himself that the assignment will not affect his ability to act in an objective,
independent and impartial capacity.  He must especially make sure that he will not be in a
position to take any decision on behalf of the audit client.  He must evaluate the matters
discussed in section 1 above and take any necessary steps to safeguard his objectivity and to
satisfy those with a legitimate interest that he has done so” (FEE, 1995, Section 4.2.1).14
3 Attainable objectives of audit regulation
The above analysis of the attributes of audit quality and of private quality safeguards will be
used in this section for the discussion of the objectives of audit quality.  Such analysis leads to
the conclusion that the regulator has two functions, namely, as facilitator and as implementer of
a  safeguard strategy:  On the one hand, the regulator needs to work indirectly, facilitating the
sanctioning, and therefore motivating, activities of the market and judges (Section 3.1).  On the
other hand, the regulator must take account of the superiority in terms of quality of a guarantee
that is based on developing safeguards, which enable advantage to be taken of economies of
scope of a contractual nature, rather than on fragmentation, which suffers from diseconomies of
both scale and scope (Section 3.2).
3.1 Regulation as a facilitator of judicial and market controls
Reflection on the role of regulation and the action of regulators in the auditing field must take
into account two types of control that operate for the auditing profession: legal sanctions, via
civil and criminal liability, and the market reaction, mainly via reputation.  Regulators can opt
either for an indirect intervention strategy by facilitating the work of these two controls and the
complementary role of self-regulation, or for a strategy of direct intervention. The objective of
this article is not to fully evaluate the relative merits of these two options, however, as this
would require a more exhaustive analysis than can reasonably be provided here.  With this
caveat in mind, our analysis of the interactions between quality attributes and private
safeguards suggests that the indirect strategy is more effective and flexible, and should play a
preferential role.
The guiding principle of regulation should therefore be to allow audit firms, self-regulatory
bodies and audit clients to discover through competitive market interaction both the efficient
mix of services and the corresponding quality safeguards, adjusting for the costs and benefits of
each possibility.  The reason for entrusting this task to the market is based on comparative
advantage: the incentives and the ability of market participants seem perfectly capable in this
case of guiding such a discovery process.  Regulators, on the other hand, frequently lack both
the required knowledge and the right incentives to define the efficient framework.  The lack of
knowledge is inherent in their position as neither producers nor clients.  The defective
incentives are to be found in at least two potential biases.  They may tend, firstly, to exaggerate15
possible external effects and consequently require higher than optimum quality and quantity, as
this additional quality involves no cost for them.  Secondly, they are likely to be swayed by
private interests alien to the audit market, as shown by the variety of prohibitive or restraining
regulations.
Allowing the market to be the driving force behind trends in the audit sector does not mean
that there is no role left for regulation.  Rules are still needed to facilitate the smooth
functioning and speedy adjustment of the market.  Regulators should therefore concentrate on
promoting and facilitating competition in order to enhance market incentives, by means of
policies aimed at increasing informational transparency and facilitating the creation of private
quality safeguards.
The functions of regulators of auditing (and, to some extent, those of self-regulatory bodies)
may include  the following stages or tasks:
a) Protection of reputation.  The effectiveness of the reputational guarantee is derived from
its high degree of sensitivity.  This characteristic involves a danger when firms with reputation
are the victims of opportunistic or arbitrary action. One essential role of regulation is,
therefore, to maintain a proportion between the breach of professional duties and reputational
sanctions.  Above all, firms should be prevented from suffering sanctions of this type when they
have not failed in their professional duties. Those elements of the institutional framework
which occasionally allow both competitors and, in particular, supposedly independent third
parties from causing unwarranted harm to reputation by means of frivolous actions or by taking
precipitate precautionary measures should be reviewed.  More generally, judges and regulators
in this field should be very much aware that a good commercial reputation is surely the most
valuable, and of course the most sensitive, asset of firms of the highest quality.
b) Cautious definition of quality standards.  In the case of auditing, the existence of
minimum quality standards seems essential for the explicit safeguard mechanisms to function
effectively, principally that providing for professional liability.  A standard is in fact needed to
establish which particular conduct constitutes diligent action and which constitutes
professional malpractice.
27  Standards are also necessary in order for professionals to know
what constitutes an adequate level of quality although, in this respect, the fundamental caution
                                                
27 The results of the empirical study by Carcello and Palmrose (1994) suggest, for example,
that the supervisory activity of the SEC facilitates litigation against auditors.16
arising out of the analysis developed in Section 1.2.2 should be borne in mind: the legislative
framework must avoid the temptation of defining overly-stringent standards which would lead
to defensive audits of little informational value.  Moreover, the greater the relative importance
assigned to implicit safeguards, the less important the role of legislative standards and the
greater that of firms’ internal ones.  Furthermore, the function of the latter is different, insofar
as the market’s judgement of professional conduct is not based on compliance with standards
but on results.
c) Production of information relevant to market functioning.  Regulation can considerably
facilitate the stream of information that is useful for the functioning of the control and sanction
mechanisms operating in the open market.  One possibility is to make it obligatory to disclose
information which private parties might often be reluctant to provide because of collective
action problems or third-party effects. These might prevent individual voluntary disclosure
from reaching optimal levels with regard to both the amount and content of the disclosed
information,
28 departing from the situations in which firms disclose on their own initiative, to
avoid being classified as bad quality providers.
29 For instance, disclosure could damage the
confidentiality of the relationship with clients, possibly revealing information of strategic value
for competitors.  Even if private cost is smaller than private benefit, it may be the case that the
net surplus is positive only when all firms disclose.  However, individual firms may be better
off not disclosing if some other firms do disclose, with the final outcome that no firm
discloses.
30  Likewise, disclosed information might be more valuable when it is used to obtain
knowledge about the industry or it serves to make comparisons amongst firms in the industry.
In both cases, the value of the information disclosed by any one firm is not fully appropriated
by it, generating positive externalities. Furthermore, regulation may enjoy some advantages
over the market in standardizing the contents and the language of disclosure.
31
                                                
28 For an account of the main issues involved in corporate disclosure along similar lines to the
one argued here, see Easterbrook and Fischel (1991, pp. 276-314).
29 See Grossman and Hart (1980), Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981).
30 Jovanovic (1982), Verrecchia (1983) and Dye (1986) model situations in which uninformed
parties do not always infer bad quality from non-disclosure, due to the presence of disclosure
costs.  As a consequence, voluntary disclosure is less than optimal.  In particular, disclosure is
not profitable for those providers of bad but not the worst quality at some point in the quality
scale.
31 This can be particularly important when limiting discretion controls the informational content
of the disclosure because discretion affects how the disclosed information is seen by
recipients, as modeled in Fishman and Hagerty (1990).17
Consequently, regulators should focus  on eliminating any barriers that might be hindering
disclosure on a voluntary basis.  Candidates for this can be derived directly from the previous
discussion.  In particular, mandatory disclosure should be seen and structured as a solution to
free-riding problems among potential disclosers. Moreover, the regulator can act as ex post
verifying agent.  By providing more information to the market, the latter thereby becomes more
transparent, and any adjustments or sanctions which the market itself imposes on operators who
reduce quality are faster.  Also, the regulatory body is in a good position to act as a central
recipient of information regarding the sector, both of a statistical and monitoring nature.  In
particular, it has the advantage of acting as a depository of information relating to compliance
with legislation, the disclosure of which to the market could compromise competition between
firms. This is easily controllable both directly by the regulatory authority and indirectly (in
which case, the reliability of the information is only verified in the case of inspection or
litigation).
d) Monitoring of compliance with quality standards by the regulator or self-regulatory
bodies has a major advantage—understanding of a discipline of a professional and specialized
nature, which favors control being carried out by the experts themselves.  Nevertheless, the
risks are also considerable.  Control by a public regulator is capable of being ineffective and
very costly, as experience has shown in other sectors in many countries.  On the other hand,
both procedures, particularly self-regulation, can easily succumb to the temptation of
encouraging anti-competitive practices.  For these reasons, priority should be given to
facilitating the functioning of the other control mechanisms of both a legal and market nature.
3.2 Fragmentation versus safeguard regulatory strategies
There are considerable problems in contracting professional services as a result of the
substantial informational asymmetries between supplier and client, as explained in Section 1.
This informational inequality usually generates conflicts of interest of all types.  To overcome
these problems, two possibilities can be put forward at a theoretical and general level.  These
will be referred to as fragmentation and safeguard strategies:
a) The fragmentation strategy functions by assigning the different stages or components of
contractual processes to different professionals, trusting that by acting in opposition, conflicts
of interest will be reduced.  It thus seeks to contain the conflict of interest which gives rise to
the problem, and can therefore be expected  ideally to lead to lower safeguard costs.  On the18
other hand, the economies of scale and, in particular, economies of joint production (or
“scope”) which are usually generated when the same professional is involved in several
stages, or plays several roles in the same contractual process, must be sacrificed.  Joint audits,
which are compulsory in various European countries,
32 are an extreme example of
fragmentation strategy. They aim at improving independence by superimposing two parallel
checks.  Mandatory rotation also involves something of this strategy, although the aim is
sequential rather than parallel verification.  An important problem of both types of regulation is
obviously cost: rotation duplicates the start-up costs for each rotation and pure joint auditing
duplicates virtually all costs.
b) The alternative safeguard strategy seeks to eliminate the consequences or manifestations
of conflicts of interest rather than their origin, to which end the incentives of professionals need
to be reinforced in order that they respond correctly to all eventualities.  This therefore
involves greater safeguard costs but brings with it the benefit of economies of scale and,
particularly, economies of scope.  In this area, for example, very different solutions are
adopted in different countries in real-estate transactions.  The fragmentation strategy dominates
in the Anglo-Saxon world, in which each party is represented by his own lawyer.  In European
legal systems, on the other hand, the figure of the Latin or Roman-Germanic notary to a large
extent plays the role of lawyer simultaneously and independently for the two or three parties
usually involved in transactions.
33  Even more clearly, the Spanish registration system
embodies certification functions in the Registrar which in other neighboring systems are
carried out through a costly process of notification and defense by the parties affected
(Germany).  Also, in those countries which, like the United States, maintain the old “recording”
system of simple deposit of documents to give effect to transactions, even longer and more
costly sequences of intermediaries and title insurance need to be employed.
34
In summary, a guarantee of quality in transactional services can be sought in fragmentation
and confrontation or in the safeguard of integrated action. The latter is not only generally more
economical but it can also provide higher quality, for two reasons.  Firstly, it enjoys economies
                                                
32 Specifically, different variations of joint auditing are required in Denmark, Finland, France,
Italy (distributing part of the work) and Sweden, according to Buijink et al. (1996, pp. 41-2).
Joint audits are also required for specific firms in some other countries (e.g. for banks in
Canada).
33 See Arruñada (1995 and 1996).
34 See Arruñada (1998).19
of joint production, of both a technological and contractual nature.
35  Secondly, the reduction in
conflicts of interest which fragmentation aims to achieve is not always achieved. Application
of these ideas in the auditing field is closely connected with the provision of non-audit
services.  A prohibitive rule would place us in the costly area of fragmentation.  On the other
hand, simultaneous provision of auditing and non-audit services may enable higher quality to
be provided at a lower cost.
36
4 Conclusions
Three elements are crucial in developing an efficient regulation of auditing: “professional
judgement”, the tricky nature of audit quality and the existence of alternative quality assurance
techniques.
First, professional  judgement means that auditors use information that is unverifiable or
costly to verify when deciding on an audit report.  As a consequence, verification capabilities
determine which approach regulators should follow.  If they think that the market is able to
verify and sanction a broader set of performance variables than the regulators or the judiciary
can, then regulation should be market-friendly in the sense of facilitating market sanctions
instead of substituting them. Otherwise regulation risks inducing “defensive auditing” with
auditors using only hard evidence to support their opinions, and audits becoming trivial.
The second important element for regulating audit quality is that clients are mainly harmed
not when their audit has low quality but when some other client of the same auditing firm
unexpectedly fails, without any warning from the auditor.  Therefore, clients have very strong
incentives to monitor, evaluate and compensate audit firms’ quality.  Meaningful regulation
would focus on helping this monitoring process by providing useful information. This could
                                                
35 Taking advantage of economies of scope is the basis of the so-called gatekeepers, taken as
guardians of the law, developed by Kraakman (1986), who defines them as private agents
“who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers. [....
This cooperation or] support—usually a specialized good, service, or form of certification that
is essential for the wrongdoing to succeed—is the ‘gate’ that the gatekeeper keeps” (pp. 53-4).
For the auditor’s work to correspond faithfully to this figure, essentially this depends on the
importance given to his role as producer of “externalities”, that is, the economic effects which
are external to the parties involved in the transaction.
36 This argument has been developed in Arruñada (1999: 69-108).20
make it advisable to adopt mandatory disclosure rules if private incentives in this regard are
considered insufficient because of problems of collective action among and within audit firms.
The third element to consider is that audit firms use diverse mechanisms to safeguard quality
such as reputation and specific assets.  These differ in the costs of putting them in place and
their suitability to different situations and clients.  Regulation should take into account how
these mechanisms work in order, first, not to hinder the use of low-cost safeguards such as
client quasi-rents or “brand-stretching”.  Second, regulation should allow some discretion in
order for firms and clients to choose an efficient mix of safeguards.21
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